Coopers-Curraba

Geological setting and mineral system

The prospect sits in the Woolomin Beds of the southern New England Orogen — polydeformed, highly siliceous metasediments with green schists, jaspers, cherts and tuffaceous interbeds — a belt that hosts structurally controlled orogenic gold and antimony–gold mineralisation elsewhere (R00029633; R00029598). The State metallogenic record already classifies the deposit as a gold system: the Tamworth–Hastings 1:250,000 metallogenic map labels locality 255 the “Mt Carrington (Coopera Curripa) Copper-Zinc-Gold Mine” (R00001219/1220). The working model is a structurally controlled gold (±Sb by analogy only) system in which gold occupies arsenopyrite-bearing graphitic shears and quartz-veined schist, largely independent of the conformable copper–silver massive sulphide the historical workings exploited. This is a target hypothesis, not an established interpretation: it is one of five readings weighed in the synthesis (§5.4), with a graphite-conductor alternative given equal weight. The down-dip continuation of the gold-bearing horizon is a projection from a hole terminated at 79.4 m — no historical hole has passed 79.4 m down-hole — and the southern corridor's position is a local-grid inference pending datum conversion (C-3).

The grades — what the system has already demonstrated

Result (GSNSW open-file, verbatim-sourced)	Confirmation status and Phase 1 resolution
0.85 g/t Au over 1.17 m — MC DDH1 sample 67, 49.2–50.4 m, quartz-banded green schist above the sulphide (English 1968, R00029598)	The highest gold value in either hole — a single historical sample, not closed off by any second intercept; 1968 AAS assay with no QA/QC and unknown detection limit (Appendix C, C-4). Resolved by Phase 1 core/pulp location and modern fire-assay re-assay; the pre-specified kill: failure to reproduce ≥ 0.5 g/t Au over ≥ 1 m at this position abandons the thesis.
2.05 % Cu, 6 g/t Ag over 0.30 m — MC DDH1 sample 71, 53.7–54.0 m, massive sulphide (R00029598)	Gold not detected — the direct evidence that gold and copper are spatially decoupled. The synthesis carries a correction forward: the prominent “6.0” values at the sulphide are silver, not gold, per the original Ag/Au log column order.
0.04–0.25 g/t Au — individual sample assays — MC DDH1 samples 86–94, 69.1–79.4 m (end of hole), arsenopyrite (logged to 10 %)–graphite schist (R00029598)	Deliberately not aggregated into an interval tenor (synthesis §5.2): sample spacing and a single hole do not support a length-weighted reading. The hole terminated in anomalous ground; total depth carries a footnoted source conflict (251′ / 260′ / 260′5″; 79.4 m adopted — C-10, closed). Same Phase 1 re-assay resolution as above.
3.96 % Cu — 318 kg bulk sample (surface) — shaft ore shipped to Port Kembla; shaft channel samples to ~4 % Cu, 0.38 % Zn (Planet Metals Ltd 1969, R00029633)	A smelter-scale bulk assay demonstrating a real mineralised system — but a copper-era result, not the Au–Ag target. The 1885 figures of 8–14 % Cu are reproduced in the record but were regarded as unreliable by Thomson 1951 (R00018549) and are not relied on here.

The only intercepts in this document appear above. All are historical, carry no documented QA/QC, and are sub-economic spot values presented as exploration vectors only.

Exploration history — three operators, documented exits

Period	Operator (title)	Model targeted	Departure reason (as documented)
1883–1885	Independent miners (pre-licence workings)	Lode copper; alluvial placer gold worked at surface	Operations suspended after a mining accident with little further work recorded; the 1969 review attributes the wider failure to the copper price and transport difficulties of the period (Thomson 1951, R00018549; Planet Metals Ltd 1969, R00029633).
1950–51	The Zinc Corporation Ltd (inspection, Memo No. 173)	Pyrite / sulphur source	Judged too small to be of further interest as a pyrite source — a sulphur-market sizing decision; no gold or silver was assayed in the evaluation (Thomson 1951, R00018549).
1967–69	Planet Metals Ltd (A-to-P 47, Walcha)	Copper — down-dip lode projection and IP anomaly	Abandoned on copper grounds: the lode showed no strike expression and the remaining possibility was depth; the precious-metal assay column was never interpreted (English 1968, R00029598; Planet Metals Ltd 1969, R00029633).
1970–2012	Eastmet (EL 232); Goodwin/Fontanella & Cooper-Southam (PL 850, EL 4095/4098/4460, ML 180); AGI/QBL (EL 7409)	Regional nickel; alluvial placer gold; deep-lead alluvial gold	All expired or relinquished; every post-1969 programme was directed at alluvial, nickel, diamond or petroleum targets — none re-drilled MC DDH1/2, re-assayed the core, or tested the hard-rock target (synthesis §2; residual DiGS sweep, C-7).

Every campaign found mineralisation; every recorded departure is economic or model-driven, and no post-1969 titleholder tested the hard-rock target (final DiGS sweep pending, C-7).

Why the grade is still available

Wrong commodity, wrong model. Planet Metals' own January 1969 summary records: “A significant amount of alluvial gold was won, the tailings being later worked over by the Chinese. Although gold is associated with the deposit, the price of copper and the transport difficulties made operations — at that time — uneconomic” (Planet Metals Ltd 1969, R00029633, §Previous Investigations). The synthesis is explicit about what this is and is not: a statement about the historic alluvial gold, made by a copper geologist who did not assay for gold in his own programme — not an endorsement of the decoupled bedrock target. The 1968 exit reasoning is likewise recorded: English concluded the lode had “no expression along strike” and that “the only possibility then is depth” (English 1968, R00029598, §Structure and Size of the Lode) — deployed as grounds to stop on copper; the synthesis's gold re-reading is expressly a re-interpretation of the same observations, not a new measurement.

The analytical gap. The government-database audit finding is specific: arsenic and antimony were never assayed in any campaign on the property. The arsenopyrite–gold association is a logging observation only (C-2); the “±Sb” is imported from the regional analogue alone (C-1); the 1950 grab sample assayed no gold or silver; and the 1968 programme's own gold column was never interpreted. Independent corroboration that gold belongs to the system comes from outside CAADIA's re-reading: the State metallogenic map lists gold (and zinc) among the deposit's recognised commodities (R00001219/1220), and modern bulk sampling under PL 850 (1982–84) confirmed a persistent local placer system in the Nuggetty Gully terraces — corroborating context that itself adds no bedrock assay.

The untested target. The formal historical recommendation was never actioned. The Department of Mines assessor is recorded as recommending drilling aid for MC DDH1 but withholding it for MC DDH2, on the grounds that a ~76 m hole was not long enough to adequately test the geophysical anomaly south of the shaft, an adequate test being estimated at approximately 152 m (Planet Mining Co. Pty Ltd 1968, R00013680 — departmental wording paraphrased pending verification against the original, C-8). A deeper-penetration IP array recommended on Line 6 was likewise never run. In the synthesis's precise formulation: neither 1968 hole drilled the southern frequency-effect anomaly itself — MC DDH1 tested the copper lode east of the shaft and MC DDH2 a background position — and “the southern anomaly was, on this basis, never adequately drill-tested.” 

The miss, precisely. Planet Metals paid for gold assays and never read them: the 1968 programme was designed, drilled and abandoned as a copper test, and the precious-metal column in its own logs — the best gold above the sulphide lode, not in it, and a gold-with-arsenopyrite tail still running at end of hole — was never interpreted. The hole stopped at 79.4 m in anomalous ground; the southern IP anomaly was never itself drilled; and the two elements that would have exposed the pattern, arsenic and antimony, were never assayed in any campaign. The miss is therefore not a missing intercept — it is an uninterpreted one, sitting in the open file since 1968 (English 1968, R00029598).

System scale and the 2026 price lens

Footprint (dimensions, never tonnes). The 1968 IP survey ran six lines at 61 m spacing; its strongest frequency-effect anomalies sit on lines ~30 m and ~152 m south of the shaft, with a coincident north-north-east magnetic trend. On Line 3 the polarisable body was interpreted to extend beyond 122 m depth — the maximum theoretical penetration of the 61 m array — against a deepest drill test on the property of 79.4 m, terminating in anomalous ground. Historic lode strike estimates conflict and are reproduced as recorded: 30–60 m probable (Thomson 1951) versus ~120 m north as cited in 1969.

Model class. The setting is consistent with the structurally controlled gold (±Sb) style of the southern New England Orogen; the synthesis applies no grade or tonnage from any analogue and implies no resource — the analogue is geological context only. The honest conservative case is stated in the synthesis as arguably the null hypothesis: carbonaceous, pyrrhotite–arsenopyrite turbidites in this belt routinely carry 0.01–0.3 g/t Au regionally without hosting a deposit.

Price lens. The synthesis advances no price-based commercial argument, so none is imported here. One observation is supportable, and it is CAADIA's framing, not any historical operator's: every documented exit was priced on period copper economics and transport, and the ground has never been economically assessed as a gold project at any gold price — context only, no recovery, mining or processing costs applied.

The targets

Primary — the southern IP frequency-effect corridor (Target B). Its known technical limitation is stated plainly: IP cannot confirm gold, graphite alone can produce the frequency-effect and resistivity response, and the 1968 operators themselves attributed the southern response partly to graphite — the graphite-conductor reading is the single most likely kill and carries equal weight with the preferred model. The designed test is CCD002 (120 m, −55°, sited after datum conversion): the first drill test of the anomaly, designed precisely to discriminate sulphide from barren graphite; the gold-confirmation burden sits separately with re-assay and surface geochemistry, gated ahead of any new geophysics.

Secondary — the open arsenopyrite–gold tail (Target A): the samples 86–94 horizon open below the 79.4 m end of hole; CCD001 (180 m, 278°/−60°) twins the sulphide and sample-67 zone and continues ~100 m beyond the 1968 hole. Contingent — the hangingwall quartz-banded gold zone (Target C): strike continuity of the sample-67 horizon, tested by CCD003 (150 m) only on defined Stage 1 success.

Testing the thesis — gates, kill criteria, cost to answer

Phase + cost	Scope	Gate & kill criterion
Stage 1 — desktop, A$8,000–17,000	Full DiGS report sweep (A$2,000–4,000); MinView/Titles Web tenure check; datum conversion + GPS shaft verification (blocking); core/pulp location at GSNSW Londonderry.	The kill answer for the load-bearing “not re-tested since 1969” premise costs A$2,000–4,000 and is binary: any post-1969 gold-focused negative test of the corridor abandons the thesis. Ground not open or competing application → play paused.
Stage 2 — confirmatory re-assay, A$5,000–15,000 (fallback A$40,000–120,000 if no material survives)	Modern fire-assay gold + full As–Sb–W–Te ICP-MS on located core/pulps with inserted CRMs, blanks and duplicates — the first As or Sb measurement ever made on the property.	Binary and pre-specified: failure to reproduce ≥ 0.5 g/t Au over ≥ 1 m at the sample-67 position, or to confirm the deeper arsenopyrite-associated values, treats the gold signal as unverified and abandons the thesis.
Stage 2 — field, A$60,000–145,000 incl. 15–20 % contingency	Surface multi-element geochemistry and drainage mapping (A$15,000–30,000); modern IP/DCIP gated behind the geochemistry (A$25,000–60,000); independent CP review (A$10,000–25,000); heritage and access (A$10,000–30,000).	IP can only kill or sustain — it cannot confirm gold: no coherent anomaly abandons the corridor. If surface work cannot resolve a drillable geometry, no drill target is defined and the programme does not advance.
Phase 1 drilling (conditional) — Stage 1 A$180,000–260,000 (central ~A$220,000); Stage 2 A$90,000–140,000	CCD001 (180 m) + CCD002 (120 m), HQ→NQ oriented diamond core, gyro down-hole surveys, DGPS collars; QA/QC ~15 % of the assay stream (CRM, blank, duplicate at 1-in-20, ~5 % umpire). CCD003 (150 m) only on gate.	Drill design gate, quoted: “a defensible down-hole gold intercept (indicatively a gram-metre improvement on the 1968 tail, e.g. ≥ 1 m at ≥ 0.5 g/t Au or a wider low-grade zone that strengthens with depth), and/or sulphide rather than barren graphite explaining the southern IP anomaly.” A barren CCD002 is a real, designed-for outcome.

Technical Manager: Dr Tim McConachy FAusIMM (1974), Senior Fellow SEG, former Rio Tinto Chief Geologist.

Data room (under NDA): technical synthesis v4.1, Phase 1 drill programme design, source register and figure set.

Contact: Doug Alcock, Managing Director, CAADIA Metals Pty Ltd — dalcock@caadiametals.com.au

No JORC (2012) Mineral Resource, Ore Reserve or Exploration Target is declared or implied. Historical results are compiled from GSNSW open-file (DIGS) records, have not been verified by a Competent Person for public reporting, and are provided for context only. The IRGS / distal-replacement interpretation is a working hypothesis under test; alternative interpretations of the geophysical data exist. Earn-in terms are indicative and non-binding, subject to contract, due diligence and grant of the Exploration Licence.